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On the Possibility of Constitutional Court’s Review of 
Directives on Unifying the Case Law in the Republic of 
Hungary 
 
 
Abstract. The present study undertakes the review of one of the essential authorities of 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court: the issue of abstract subsequent norm control, which 
is currently amongst the most significant questions. The possibility of the constitutional 
review of the Supreme Court’s directives on unifying the case law is subject to debate in 
legal literature and in the intercourse between the two organs as well. This study intends 
to elicit the nature of the problem through the elaboration of relating regulation and by 
utilizing certain Constitutional Court decisions concerning the subject. It will arrive at 
the conclusion that the present regulation also gives scope to the Constitutional Court 
review of directives on unifying the case law. The paper gives a survend evaluation of the 
solutions involved in the draft of the new Constitutional Court Act too. 
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In the Republic of Hungary, the Constitutional Court, since the beginning of 
their operation, 1st January 1990, have significantly restricted the legislative 
activity of the Parliament and the Government, because the body has enforced 
the provisions of the Constitution against actual-political influences without 
any compromise. Beside these two branches of power, however the Consti-
tutional Court has relatively few points of contact with the third branch: the 
courts. Because the Constitutional Court may review or refuse the review of 
the directives of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court may come into on 
unifying the case law conflict with the Constitutional Court. It is of special 
actuality at present, because the reform of the regulation on the Constitutional 
Court is the question of the day. The Ministry of Justice has published the draft 
of the amendment of the Constitution (hereinafter Constamend1) and the draft 
of the new Act on the Constitutional Court (hereinafter ConstCourt bill1) in its 
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home page1 and in an altered and revised form they soon appeared in the home 
page of the Parliament too.2 (Hereinafter the revised version will be referred to 
as Constamend2 and ConstCourt bill2.) These drafts may obviously be revised 
before adoption. In this respect the declarations of certain public figures; 
ministers, the President of the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court justices 
will help to understand this issue more properly.  
 The present study will examine the question from two angles. On the one 
hand, from the point of view if upon the present regulation the Constitutional 
Court is entitled to review the constitutionality of the directives of the Supreme 
Court on unifying the case law, on the other hand from the aspect if the future 
regulation should coercively involve this possibility. 
 
 
I. The possibility for the examination on the ground of the prevailing 
legal situation 
 
In the Hungarian constitutional system according to the Constitution, the 
highest judicial forum is the Supreme Court (Article 47, Paragraph 1) and the 
highest organ safeguarding the Constitution is the Constitutional Court. Never-
theless, the Constitutional Court does not form part of the regular judicial 
forum-system and there is no subordinating or superordinating relation between 
the two organs. The Hungarian legal system, as opposed to the German solution, 
does not make the possibility to review the constitutionality of the judicial 
decisions by the Constitutional Court. Making use of the authority of the 
Constitutional Court, which is named constitutional complaint in Hungary, the 
unconstitutional law forming the ground of a concrete case may be contested 
before the Constitutional Court and if it turns out right, the procedure may be 
restarted in a legal environment compatible with the fundamental law. 
 The Constitutional Court thus is not entitled to examine single judicial 
decisions. It is doubtful, however if the directives of normative character 
unifying the case law, handed down by the Supreme Court may be the subject 
of a constitutional control, and whether it was necessary and proper to involve 
them in the new draft. The question arises because the directives on unifying 
the case law are of normative character, but neither the Constitution nor the 
Act on the Constitutional Court provide an expressis verbis statement on the 
possibility of a Constitutional Court review. The question of a review is due to 
the normativity of the directives on unifying the case law. 

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1. A few characteristics of directives on unifying the case law 
 
a) Pursuant to Article 47, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution the Supreme Court 
shall assure the uniformity of the administration of justice by the courts3 and 
its resolutions concerning uniformity shall be binding on all the courts.4 The 
role of the directives on unifying the case law is to ensure the uniformity of the 
judicature. In the course of judicial discretion it may happen that given legal 
principles are construed in different ways, consequently in cases of similar 
character, decisions of different content may be passed. The uniformity of law 
enforcement should be ensured in order to eliminate this problem. For the sake 
of the course, the Supreme Court5 pass directives on unifying the case law6 and 

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3
 This provision of the Constitution does not preclude that an act would amplify the 
ways of task fulfilment of the Supreme Court—beside directives on unifying the case 
law—for the sake of the fulfilment of this constitutional duty. It was done by the Act on 
the Judicial System when provided on the publication of court decisions of principle. On 
the ground of the provisions of the Act on the Judicial System, it can be stated the 
regulation of the publication of court decisions of principle wanted to entitle all the judges 
and courts to contribute to the improvement of legal legislation. 12/2001 (14.05) Const. 
Court resolution, ABH 2001. 163, 173. 
 
4
 Due to this provision of the Constitution, the force of directives on unifying the case 
law necessarily has an effect on litigants through the application of law, by transmitting the 
ruling based on the obligatory interpretation of law. This general force of directives on 
unifying the case law ensuing from Article 47, paragraph 2 of the Constitution, which is 
binding on the courts, may be effective after it has been passed. Cases involved in the acts 
of procedure may be different if the directives on unifying the case law (may) directly 
allude to the basic case(s) as well. 12/2001 (14. 05) Const. Court resolution, ABH 2001. 
163, 173.  
 
5
 Article 33 of the Act on the Judicial System regulates the role of colleges in the 
procedure of the Paragraph 1 analyses the practice of the courts and forms an opinion in 
contested questions of law enforcement, so as to provide a uniform litigation practice. 
According to the Constitutional Court this provision does not infringe legal security, 
because in this case the problem is not if the colleges of the Supreme Court or county 
courts decide in certain professional matters definitively and with a binding force. The rule 
concerning college opinion in questions of law enforcement involved in the Act on the 
Judicial System merely a provision that promotes the ruling upon a disputed question of 
law. The other rules of the Act on the Judicial System, which provide proposal making and 
initiative right to college leaders for the launching of a unity of law procedure, also 
corroborate this fact. It may happen—according to the wording of the act “if necessary”—, 
when the uniformity of law enforcement requires more than a college opinion. 12/2001 
(14. 05) Const. Court resolution, ABH 2001. 163, 174. 
 
6
 According to the view of the Constitutional Court, the Act on the Judicial System 
lays emphasis on the uniform judgement of questions of principle and for this sake within 
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proclaim judicial decisions of principle.7 The directives on unifying the case 
law must be published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Hungary. 
According to the Constitutional Court, this provision has fulfilled the require-
ment relevant from the point of view of legal security, namely the cognizability 
and predictable application of the directives on unifying the case law, since the 
persons and institutions concerned may get knowledge of the decision of the 
Supreme Court in a proper way.8 Thus, a directive on unifying the case law is a 
normative decision of the Supreme Court released in a procedure regulated by 
an act, which is binding on all the courts so the content involved in a directive 
on unifying the case law has a binding force upon all the subjects taking part in 
the judicial procedure. As a consequence of this, the specification of the 
directives on unifying the case law among the normative provisions is debated 
even in the special literature. Related to this the following remarks must be 
made. 
 b) The system of sources of law in the Republic of Hungary is regulated 
partly in the Constitution and partly in Act 11 of 1987 on Legislation. The 
system of sources of law is divided into two parts by the Act. On the one hand, 
it distinguishes provisions entailing rights and duties upon subjects, on the 
other hand specifies other legal means of the so-called state administration, like 
decisions and directives. The latter have no binding force on subjects, their 
function generally is to provide the uniform direction within the given 
                               
the court organisation system regulates the “mechanism”, through which court decisions 
deciding questions of principle may get to higher judicial forums, finally to the Supreme 
Court. Thus, the procedure concerning decisions of principle is regulated in the Act on the 
Judicial System. If the court decision of principle is submitted to the Supreme Court, the 
duties and rights of the Supreme Court, laid down in the Constitution are to be followed: 
namely: the uniformity of the law enforcement of the courts. If the Supreme Court require 
to form an opinion of principle expressed in a court ruling widely known in the litigation 
practice, the decision may be published. In this way, judicial practice may be properly 
oriented. The Act on the Judicial System does not refer to the observance of court rulings, 
and does not contain provisions like the Constitution does in relation to the directives on 
unifying the case. According to the Constitutional Court, a directive on unifying the case 
may be initiated if the reverse practice has developed due to the neglect of a court ruling 
previously published by the courts. Nevertheless, the directives on unifying the case law as 
a consequence of this, have a binding force on the courts. Thus the possibility that court 
rulings of principle may be published, will not bring about legal insecurity, because, 
contrasted with unity of law resolutions, it is not compulsory. 12/2001. (14. 05) Const. 
Court resolution, ABH 2001. 163, 173–174.  
 
7
 Petrétei, J.: Magyar alkotmányjog II. Államszervezet. [Hungarian Constitutional Law 
II, State Organisation]. Budapest–Pécs, 2000. 213.  
 
8
 12/2001 (14. 05) Const. Court resolution, ABH 2001. 163, 169. 
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organisation. The directives of the Supreme Court on unifying the case law are 
mentioned neither among the laws, nor among the other legal means of state 
administration.  
c) By virtue of Article 32/A of the Constitution the Constitutional Court 
shall review the constitutionality of laws and attend to the duties assigned 
to its competence by law. On this ground does Act 32 of 1989 on the Consti-
tutional Court relegate the subsequent constitutional review of other legal 
means of state administration within the competence of this body.9  
 d) There may arise the question, however if the Constitutional Court is entitled 
to review, besides laws and statutes and other legal means of state administration, 
other acts of normative character, not relegated within its authority, for 
instance directives on unifying the case law. In order to find the answer it is 
worth examining the major characteristics of relevant directives. First of all, it 
must be stated that besides unifying the case law directives, certain decisions 
of the court may also have a normative content. In a certain sphere, for 
instance the formally binding force of judicial precedents has been recognised. 
Namely pursuant to Article 29 on the Act on the Judicial System,10 a division 
of the Supreme Court in legal matters may reach a divergent ruling from that 
of another division of the Supreme Court, if the unifying the case law directive 
passed in the unifying procedure on its initiation provides that.11 Nevertheless 
the primary aim of the above mentioned provision of the Act on the Judicial 
System is not to express the normative character but to safeguard legal security 
by providing the uniformity of litigation within the supreme forum of juris-
diction. Normative character refers here just to the relation among the unifying 
the case law divisions of the Supreme Court, and its purpose is to eliminate 
their different interpretation of law. Because of this, it has no direct effect on 
the litigation of the lower courts. They are effected exclusively by a directives 
on unifying the case law passed in the procedure referred to above, which—
due to its abstract character—has a binding force on all the courts, thus, 

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9
 Cf. with 27/1995 (15. 05) Const. Court resolution. ABH (the collection of the 
resolutions of the Constitutional Court) 1995. 129, 135. 
 
10
 Act 66 of 1997. 
 
11
 	
[Fundamental rights and sources of law]. 
In: Emlékkönyv Ádám Antal egyetemi tanár születésének 70. évfordulójára [Book published 
in honour of Professor Antal, Ádám on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of his birth] 
(ed.: Petrétei, J.). Pécs, 2000. 187. In relation to this it is worth mentioning that binding 
force related to the courts can be regarded only as temporary since it will exist until the 
directive on unifying the case law is passed in the subject. After that, precedents will lose 
their—very narrow-ranging—binding force.  
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concerning the subjects in the judicial process it has an effect of de facto 
provision.  
 e) As concerns unifying the case law, in 1976 a member of the Constitu-
tional Court István Kukorelli, expounded his still pertinent opinion related to 
normative acts—directives, decisions of principle—of that time, which cannot 
be passed at present, however the existing ones cannot be neglected either.12 
According to this, general norms, which are launched by the governing organs 
within a given organizational system upon the right of hierarchy, may be 
regarded as controlling norms. The major function of these norms is to ensure 
the uniform and concerted operation of different organs within the given 
organization. “Governing norms join provisions bearing a general binding 
force, interpret and explain their content but they should not primarily regulate 
social relations.”13 The practice of the Supreme Court puts directives on 
unifying the case law closer to controlling norms. The approach, according to 
which the directives on unifying the case law of the Supreme Court form a 
separate group of legal directives, is similar to this. Namely, these norms of 
law interpretation—as opposed to other directives—pursuant to the provision 
of the Constitution are binding also formally on the courts.14  
 f) Nevertheless, according to other opinions directives on unifying the case 
law not even in their effect bear provisional characteristics. Pursuant to this 
view, directives on unifying the case law is a constitutional institution of law, 
which joins the exclusive jurisdictional authority of the courts and upon the 
authorization of the Constitution falls within the power of the Supreme Court. 
This is the highest level judicial interpretation of law, bearing the aim to 
ensure the constitutional obligation connected to the principle of legal 

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12
 According to the statement of the Constitutional Court the survival of directives, 
decisions of principle and divisional opinions will not infringe legal security until a 
unifying the case law of different content is created. In order to provide the uniform 
litigation practice, compared to the previous rather complicated means of professional 
administration, directives on unifying the case law denote a new “quality”, by no means. 
Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution does not prove necessity to review unjustified en 
masse previous directives, decisions of principle and divisional opinions limited to 
deadlines. The issue of directives, decisions of principle and college opinions had adequate 
constitutional and statutory basis (Act 46 of 1972, Article 46 and 499, passing them—just 
like in the case of unity of law resolution—falls within the authority of the Supreme Court. 
12/2001 (14. 05) Const. Court resolution. ABH 2001. 163, 175. 
 
13
 Kukorelli, I.: A Legfe
  
 
 [On the norm 
creating activity of the Supreme Court].  Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1976/11. 658. 
 
14
 Rácz: op. cit., 187. 
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security.15 According to the representative of this viewpoint, interpretation can 
never get to the field of law enforcement by chance. At this point, it must be 
noted that it is true as a requirement, but as a possibility, it cannot be excluded. 
  
 Since there is quite a large number of similar, colliding views, it is worth 
examining the place of the directives on unifying the case law in the system of 
normative acts, and through this, the possibility for a Constitutional Court 
review.  
 
2. On the Constitutional Court review of the directives on unifying the case 
 
a) The normative character as the preliminary condition for the 
 Constitutional Court control 
 
The institution of the Constitutional Court, as a basic rule, was intended to 
review normative acts.16 Article 46, Paragraph 2 of the Act on the Judicial 
System has taken the individual decisions expressively off the review of the 
Constitutional Court, since they are not decisions of a normative content. The 
Constitutional Court has rejected the constitutional review of individual 
parliamentary decisions several occasions on the ground that they are single 
acts without a normative binding force, thus pursuant to the Act on the Judicial 
System, their review falls off the authority of the Constitutional Court.17 A few 
other exceptions, which however fall within the regulation sphere of special 
acts, were also made. The exceptions are as follows. 
 Pursuant to the Act on the Electoral System on matters of a national 
referendum or popular initiative, a complaint can be submitted to the Constitu-
tional Court. In cases like that, the Court obviously acts upon single decisions.18 
 The competence of the Constitutional Court safeguarding the self-govern-
ments and autonomy of institutions of higher education also form an exception. 
On the ground of the Act on Higher Education, provisions and single decisions 

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15
 Szabó, Gy.: A bírói precedensjog kezdetei Magyarországon [The origins of judicial 
precedent law in Hungary]. In:  	
	 

 [The Fifth Hungarian Jurist 
Assembly]. Budapest, 2000. 52. 
 
16
 Individual, concrete court rulings can be regarded neither as norms, nor as legal 
sources, thus the review of their constitutionality does not fall under the powers of the 
Constitutional Court. However, no genuine constitutional examination of Constitutional 
Court acts of normative effect has been performed yet. 
 
17
 Cf. e.g. with 52/1993 (07.10) Const. Court resolution ABH 1993. 407, 408) and 
15/1999 (03. 06) Const. Court resolution ABH 1999. 407, 401). 
 
18
 Act C of 1997, Article 130, Paragraph 1. 
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infringing the self-government and autonomy of higher educations can be 
challenged before the Constitutional Court.19 
 In the case of the dissolution of a local self-government, the Constitutional 
Court may express its opinion on the unconstitutional operation of the body, 
thus it will take measures definitely in a single case.20 
 Participation in the impeachment procedure against the President of the 
Republic may also be regarded as a single case.21  
 To sum up, the Constitutional Court generally exercises a norm control, but 
within a well-defined sphere, it may also undertake the constitutional review of 
acts of a normative character, and a Constitutional Court procedure in other 
single matters. 
 In the Hungarian law, within the acts of normative character there are also 
specified judicial decisions, since there are some provisions to express the 
normative character of certain court rulings.22 Nevertheless, single court 
decisions—rulings and injunctions—show up with a binding force mainly in the 
relations between the parties. The directives on unifying the case law referred to 
above are undoubtedly bear a normative character: their normativity arises from 
Article 47, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution. According to this, “the Supreme 
Court shall assure the uniformity of the administration of justice by the courts 
and its directives on unifying the case law shall be binding for all the courts”.  
 
b) Constitutional Court procedure against provisions of normative character 
 
ba) By virtue of Article 32/A of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court shall 
review the constitutionality of laws and attend to the duties assigned to its 
jurisdiction by law. On the ground of laws and under Article 1 of the Consti-
tution, the different legal means of state administration are also under a 
subsequent Constitutional Court norm control. Directives on unifying the case 
law however formally do not belong to any categories and no other provision 
refers these acts under the procedure of the Constitutional Court. Notwith-
standing, directives on unifying the case law are obviously of a normative 

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19
 Act 80 of 1993, Article 65, Paragraph 2. The bill on the Constitutional Court intends 
to take this authority off the Constitutional Court.  
 
20
 Article 19, Paragraph 3, section 1 of the Constitution. The Act on the Constitutional. 
Court would refer the act of dissolution within the authority of the Constitutional Court.  
 
21
 Article 31/A, Paragraph 6 of the Constitution. 
 
22
 Pursuant to Article 7 of the Act 66 of 1997 on the Judicial System of the courts, 
court rulings have a general binding force, even if in a case the court verifies its sphere of 
authority or the lack of its authority. Nevertheless, it must be stated that in the latter case it 
is a question of procedure and not of a content obligation.  
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character, they are binding directly on the courts but indirectly they have a 
binding force on all the subjects who are concerned by the court procedure.23  
 Related to the problems scrutinised, it must be emphasized even if the 
Constitutional Court is the supreme organ safeguarding the Constitution, still it 
has no overall right for review, and a right to nullify acts. There is not a single 
provision to state that the Constitutional Court has a right of review concerning 
all the acts bearing a normative content. The fact that every provision and other 
legal means of state administration are under Constitutional Court control does 
not mean that all the norms should fall under the control, since provision as a 
notion is not the synonym of provision of a normative content. It does not 
mean however that the organs that issue provisions of normative content could 
neglect constitutional aspects drafted by the Constitutional Court.24 Because of 
this, it is an important requirement that directives on unifying the case law 
should meet the Constitution and this appropriateness can be provided 
exclusively by the Constitutional Court.  
 bb) A frequent argument against the Constitutional Court review of 
directives on unifying the case law is that directives on unifying the case law 
expound only the content of decisions, consequently they cannot create a new 
normative content so their review is not justified. Notwithstanding, expounding 
and making the norm content concrete denotes that one potential meaning of 
the norm is made compulsory. As a consequence of this, directives on unifying 
the case law—by selecting one of the several interpretations and regarding it as 
a norm—make the legislators’ wish more precise and unambiguous and in this 
way it will appear for the subjects as a new binding interpretation, quasi a new 
norm.
25
 It can be regarded as that, because the original norm bears several 

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23
 In this respect, it is interesting that under Article 32, Paragraph 6 of the Act on the 
Judicial System “directives on unifying the case law, if the law makes no exception, has 
no binding force on the parties”. On this ground it can be stated that within a certain sphere 
the law may extend the force of directives on unifying the case law to the parties. Thus at 
this time these directives can be directly binding on the parties too. According to the 
Constitutional Court, whether this provision corresponds to the Constitution must be 
examined upon the concrete regulation case by case. Cf. with 12/2001 (14. 05) Const. Court 
resolution. ABH 2001. 163, 172. 
 
24
 Sólyom, L.: To the Tenth Anniversary of Constitutional Review. In: A megtalált 
Alkotmány? A magyar alapjogi bí [The Constitution found? The 
First Nine Years of Hungarian Constitutional Review on Fundamental Rights] (ed.: 
Halmai, G.). Budapest, 2000. 25. 
 
25
 The norm-character in itself is established by taking one of the several inter-
pretations and recognising that as exemplary. This, however means the narrowing of the 
potential narrowing of the norm, thus it can be regarded as the creation of a new norm.  
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potential meanings and content, the application of which—with one exception—
is excluded by a directive on unifying the case law. This exclusion, besides the 
exposure of the content, leads to the restriction of the norm content. Thus, the 
argument mentioned above is not suitable for the denial of the Constitutional 
Court review of directives on unifying the case law. On the other hand, the 
Constitutional Court—in accordance with its constant practice—judges acts 
according to their content and not to their names. In this way has the judicial 
body examined circular letters, ordinances etc.,26 which do not belong either to 
laws, not to other means of state administration, but according to their content 
they act in that way. In an analogue way, thus directives on unifying the case 
law may also fall within this sphere of examination, since they appear as new 
norms.
27
 
 bc) Directives on unifying the case law reveal the content of provisions and 
provide compulsory interpretation on the content of laws. If the Constitutional 
Court is entitled to the constitutional review of laws, they must be entitled to 
the review of an unconstitutional interpretation as well.28 A decree however 
rarely becomes independent, administered law: in most of the cases, the 
legislators’ activity is also required. Provided that the norm reviewed by the 
Constitutional Court is the subject of a directive on unifying the case law as 
well, the directive on unifying the case law, together with the norm must be 
referred within the examination sphere of the Constitutional Court. The 
position taken by the Constitutional Court in this respect is that the former and 
present compulsory directives of the Supreme Court are regarded as norms.29 
 


 
26
 Cf. e.g. with 60/1992 (17. 11.) Const. Court resolution. ABH 1992. 275, 277. 
 
27
 Kukorelli, István in relation to this speaks expressively about the “legislative 
practice” of the Supreme Court. Kukorelli: op. cit., 659. 
 
28
 “It cannot be neglected that the Constitutional Court should judge and nullify the 
directive or principle of a decision of the Supreme Court which supplements the ambiguous 
law enforcement with an unconstitutional law interpretation…, since from the fact that the 
Constitutional Court is entitled to judge the constitutionality of an act, it follows that it is 
empowered to judge the authentic interpretation of the act too.” Ádám, A.: A jogszabályok 

 


 [On the constitutional Court control of provisions]. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1992/12. 528. Sólyom, László states “like in the more the less, in 
the right of annulment of a provision, the exclusion of certain unconstitutional applications 
is also included.” Sólyom: op. cit., 32. 
 
29
 Holló, A.: A bírói precedensjog kezdetei Magyarországon [The origins of judicial 
precedent law in Hungary]. In: 	
	

 44. 
ON THE  POSSIBILITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S REVIEW OF UNITY 111 
  
c) Further arguments on the Constitutional Court control of directives on 
unifying the case law 
 
ca) The Constitutional Court—as I have already referred to—has taken measures 
in acts which according to their names could not belong to the procedure of the 
Constitutional Court, but in their content their effect is equivalent to acts falling 
under the review of the Constitutional Court. At the beginning of its operation 
the Court faced the fact that the central administrative organs issued their acts of 
normative content not under the name specified in the Act on legislation, such as 
e.g.: injunction, but under different names like circular letter or information.30 
Organs of lower level applied these provisions of normative content during their 
procedure, thus they had a binding force on the subjects. These circular letters 
and ordinances did not have a provisional ground, but due to the right of 
injunction etc. of the superior organ, in their effect were equal to the directives 
on unifying the case law.31 Their force—apparently—covered well-defined 
groups of well-defined organs, but in an indirect way, they made an effect on all 
the subjects who had any contact with the organization system. In a formal way, 
merely on the ground of their name the Constitutional Court could not have 
reviewed these acts, but it expounded that these provisions of normative content 
actually qualified as acts named in the Act on legislation, thus according to their 
content they were regarded as that and the procedure was applied. An analogue 
argumentation may be applied upon directives on unifying the case law too: on 
the ground of their names—formally—their Constitutional Court review is made 
impossible, but due to their content, because of their character and concerning 
other constitutional principles and fundamental law provisions referred to above, 
they can also undergo a norm control. It must be added that the acts mentioned 
did not bear a provisional base (merely because of this fact, promulgating them 
was unlawful and unconstitutional), but directives on unifying the case law have 
a constitutional basis too. These acts, due to the force of the Constitution bind 
subjects in an indirect way and they are enforceable. Notwithstanding, the force 
of a directive on unifying the case law indirectly extends on the parties by all 
means, since the courts are obliged to apply them.32 The requirement concerning 


 
30
 Cf. with 60/1992 (17. 11.) Const. Court resolution. 
 
31
 This equal character naturally appears within a different organization.  
 
32
 By virtue of Article 32 of the Act on the Judicial System “directives on unifying the 
case law, if no exception is made by the law, have no binding force on the subjects”. 
Regardless that this provision does not harmonize completely with Article 47 of the 
Constitution, because that makes directives on unifying the case law obligatory for the 
courts, this regulation seems to be senseless. 
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the review of directives on unifying the case law thus seems to be well 
grounded. 
 cb) The Constitutional Court expounded that Article 32/A of the Constitution 
gives rise only to the authority of a subsequent norm control, but this authority 
is “forcible and comprehensive”.33 The historical interpretation of the constitu-
tional rule makes clear that according to the intent of the legislation all decrees 
and other legal means of state administration, without exception, should fall 
under a Constitutional Court control.  
 cc) Beyond this, since the courts constitute the third branch of power in the 
system of the separation of powers, it is unjustified to exclude acts which are 
promulgated within the judicial system and which make – either directly or 
indirectly – a normative effect on the subjects, from under the control of the 
Constitutional Court. Whilst the normative acts of the other two branches of 
power – the legislative and the executive power – fall under this control, what 
is more, form the essence of the activity of the Constitutional Court. László 
Sólyom, states if “the monopoly of the Constitutional Court to interpret the 
Constitution has a positive legal basis, it can be an effective aid to justify the 
relationship among the courts. In lack of an express provision this provision 
may be deduced from the duty of the Constitutional Court.”34 
 
d) Further viewpoints and proposals for solution, published in the special 
 literature 
 
da) According to a clear-cut opinion, since all the courts are bound to apply the 
directives on unifying the case law of the Supreme Court, directives on 
unifying the case law indirectly bear a binding force and character on all the 
participants of the judicial procedure. Directives on unifying the case law thus 
have a normative force, they act as norms: a directive on unifying the case law 
is an abstract judicial decision with a normative force providing principles, 
which should be followed by judges in subsequent cases.35 Thus, directives on 
unifying the case law, concerning the way of their application and consequences 
obviously bear similarities with legal norms.36 The difference between directives 
on unifying the case law and legal norms is in the regulating subject, in the 
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matter regulated and in the manner, the rule is recognised. The effectiveness of 
the created norm and in connection with this, the relation of the norm with the 
Constitution, there is no difference.37 Pursuant to this opinion, when facing 
unconstitutional directives on unifying the case law the Constitutional Court can 
choose from two possibilities. The first one is to undertake a review in the form 
of a subsequent norm control—if this right is not denied—, the second one is to 
nullify the legal norm38 upon the concept of “living law”. However, the latter 
version could prevail if the so-called “genuine” constitutional complaint was 
involved in the Hungarian legal system. “In lack of this, the constitutional 
control of directives on unifying the case law cannot be neglected.”39 Unlike 
the author, I regard the nullification of directives on unifying the case law and 
not that of basic provisions as expedient and justified.  
 db) The present president of the Constitutional Court holds an opposite 
view. According to his opinion the Constitutional Court review in relation to 
directives on unifying the case law should be confided to the verification of the 
constitutional requirement. If the Supreme Court neglected the constitutional 
requirement in the process of carrying a directive on unifying the case law,40 
the Constitutional Court review of live law could be realized. The author 
states41 “a constitutional requirement thus will not institutionalise in the 
primary scope for action of the Constitutional Court, namely in legislation, but 
it functions as the aiming of law enforcement.” Starting from the constitutional 
position of the Constitutional Court, it can be verified the Constitutional Court 
is authorized to classify constitutionality, to state the conformity to the 
Constitution and to provide the official interpretation of the Constitution. 
Consequently, the interpretation, given in a directive on unifying the case law by 
the Supreme Court, if it is different from the interpretation of the Constitutional 
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Court is not a competent interpretation.42 According to his view, there should be 
developed “a procedure of the Constitutional Court and that of the Supreme 
Court built on each other in all the directives on unifying the case law in which 
the interpretation of the given thesis of the Constitution can be regarded as a 
genuine preliminary question. The procedure on a directive on unifying the 
case law – on the standard of the legal solution referred to above – should be 
suspended until the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the “preliminary 
question” of the given provision of the Constitution, initiated by the President 
of the Supreme Court. In such a “complex” procedure, the Constitutional Court 
and the Supreme Court would express their own constitutional position. 
Otherwise, the constitutionality of a directive on unifying the case law may be 
the subject of a Constitutional Court review.”43 It is worth mentioning here that 
the previous deputy-president also stated that the constitutional review of the 
directives on unifying the case law should fall within the competence of the 
Constitutional Court.44  
 dc) According to the previous Minister of Justice the Constitutional Court’s 
review of directives on unifying the case law may be justified, because they 
bear a normative function. Since the competence would be introduced in the 
Constitution, the problem of constitutionality could not occur either. She 
thinks the competence would not transform the hierarchy of jurisdiction, 
because it is a concrete matter of the Constitutional Court, thus the Court had 
no competence to review decisions in concrete cases. The minister outlined 
two variants of legal consequence. In this way, the Constitutional Court should 
either nullify the unconstitutional directive on unifying the case law or verify 
the unconstitutionality and ask the Supreme Court “for remedy”. In her opinion, 
in that case nobody would influence the Supreme Court. It is important to state 
that because the review is of constitutional respect and does not extend on 
concrete matters, it would be irrelevant in the first case too. Consequently, the 
place of the Supreme Court in the hierarchy of the judicial system would 
remain intact.  
 dd) Nevertheless, even well-known constitutional lawyers think that 
according to the regulation in force, the Constitutional Court is not entitled to 
review these acts, and had it been allowed by the amendment, the result would 
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be the amplification of the sphere of norms reviewed.45 In connection with the 
introduction of the institution they expounded that because of the ex nunc 
nullification, that would not infringe legal security. At the same time, they 
found it constitutionally perilous that while legal sources are involved in the 
Act on Legislation, there is no reference to directives on unifying the case law, 
although in their content they may be regarded as legal norm. In their opinion, 
in this case review would over-extend the law.  
 de) The ex-deputy president of the Supreme Court also argued against the 
Constitutional Court review of directives on unifying the case law. He stated 
“Pursuant to Article 38, Paragraph 1 of the Act on the Constitutional Court, the 
interpretative activity of the Court extends on the constitutional review of an 
applicable law and during this procedure they take a stand on the fact if the 
law may have an interpretation to ensure the compliance with the Constitution. 
Due to the creation of directives on unifying the case law, the legislator 
exclusively entrusted to the Supreme Court with the power at the highest-level 
of constitutional review of judicial interpretation. That is why pursuant to the 
Constitution in force, the Constitutional Court is not entitled to give a 
constitutional review of directives on unifying the case law.”46  
 The viewpoint of the author, however at several points is not properly 
grounded. Firstly, under Article 38 of the Act on the Constitutional Court 
judges may really examine the constitutionality of a law, but Article 38 
provides that the review of constitutionality of law falls within the authority of 
the Constitutional Court. Pursuant to Article 38, Paragraph 1 of the Act on 
the Constitutional Court, “the judge—besides the suspension of the judicial 
procedure—shall initiate the procedure of the Constitutional Court if in the 
case before him he has to apply a law or any other legal means of state 
administration in his judgement, the unconstitutionality of which he perceives.” 
Secondly, the provision of the Act on the Constitutional Court cited above 
does not refer to directives on unifying the case law but to laws providing the 
ground of judicial decisions. Thirdly, the fact that a judge may have a constitu-
tional review of laws during the procedure does not entail that the creation of 
the institution of directives on unifying the case law entrusted to secure the 
constitutionality of judicial law interpretation exclusively on the Supreme 
Court. Notwithstanding, there is no logical relation between these two 
statements. The aim of the creation of directives on unifying the case law was 
not to provide constitutionality, but to guarantee the uniformity of judicial 
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interpretation of legal norms. Above this, it is worth mentioning our concern is 
not to secure the constitutionality by directives on unifying the case law but to 
secure the constitutionality of directives on unifying the case law and there is a 
sharp difference between these two. Fourthly, by virtue of Article 38 of the Act 
on the Constitutional Court constitutional review can not be exclusive, because 
if the judge does not turn to the Constitutional Court, any of the parties may 
do so within sixty days after the decision enters into force. Namely, pursuant 
to Article 48 of the Act on the Constitutional Court, “Anyone whose rights 
safeguarded in the Constitution are infringed, may lodge a constitutional 
complaint to the Constitutional Court, if his grievance is due to the application 
of an unconstitutional law and has exhausted all his resource of remedy or no 
other remedy is provided for him. The constitutional complaint may be lodged 
in, in writing, within sixty days after the delivery of the effective decision.” If 
the constitutional complaint is well grounded, the court must provide remedy 
for the individual. I think these counter-arguments can refute the view-points 
above, thus even the statement that the Constitutional Court is not entitled to 
review the constitutionality of a directive on unifying the case law carries no 
conviction. 
 df) The deputy president of the supreme judicial body expressed his 
opinion in connection with the amendment of regulation too. According to this, 
the examination of the constitutional requirement decisive in the application of 
the norm, would be performed within the framework of a norm control, thus it 
was unreasonable and inappropriate to provide an independent sphere of 
authority for the Constitutional Court for the constitutional review of directives 
on unifying the case law. Thus even if the constitutional requirements were 
specified in a different way, the Constitutional Court could not decide on 
directives on unifying the case law (could not repeal or amend them).47 
Concerning the proposal however it may be criticised that the Constitutional 
Court will not examine but specify the constitutional requirement: the 
examination may cover just facts involved in the constitutional requirements, 
in a subsequent Constitutional Court procedure. On the other hand, from the 
citation it follows that the author does not consider the directives on unifying 
the case law as norms, since he makes a distinction between the review of 
directives on unifying the case law and norm control, which in my opinion is 
logically unjustified.  
 Finally, some conclusions may be drawn from the previous decisions of the 
Constitutional Court on the interpretation of its competence, on the ground of 
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which directives on unifying the case law may be involved into the sphere of 
examination too.  
 
3. Some decisions of the Constitutional Court concerning the  
 interpretation of its competence 
 
It is worthy to scrutinize here the decisions of the Constitutional Court in 
which the body exercised its competence ambiguously recorded in law, in a 
concrete way. The existence of such cases however may prove in itself that a 
Constitutional Court’s procedure does not need to have an expressis verbis 
provisional ground if the procedural competence may be deduced from other 
provisions or legal principles. Since the Constitutional Court’s right for the 
review of directives on unifying the case law is not obligatorily specified by 
law, that must be deduced, provided it is possible, from different constitutional 
or other provisions. The supporting arguments are the following:  
 a) The Constitutional Court held48 that the constitutionality of an inter-
national treaty may be reviewed not only pursuant to Article 1 a) of the Act on 
the Constitutional Court, within a preliminary norm-control procedure, but 
also by virtue of Article 1 b) of the Act on the Constitutional Court within a 
subsequent norm-control procedure. In the codification work of the Act on the 
Constitutional Court and the Constitution, there is not a single data to prove 
that legislators wanted to evade from below the norm control any kind of 
acts—for instance the act promulgating international treaties. The potential 
conditions that—with special regard to the circumstances of constitutionali-
sation and to the drafting of the Act on the Constitutional Court—this case of 
subsequent norm control was not considered separately that time, will not have 
any effect on the right of the Constitutional Court to concretise its sphere of 
authority by interpretation of legal norms. The decision of the Constitutional 
Court construing the authority of its own have a general binding force, just like 
any other of its decisions. In this interpretation the Constitutional Court is 
guided partly by the wish to fulfil its specific duty, partly by the example of 
other constitutional courts and in this way it follows the solutions required by 
the development necessary for the administration of the Constitutional Court. 
The definition of “constitutional requirements” for instance has rendered the 
solution of “constitution-conform interpretation” which is generally applied 
constitutional courts all over the world—but it frequently bears a separate 
statutory ground—introduced into Hungarian law and adjusted it to the 
standpoint expounded on the competence to interpret legal norms. In accordance 
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with its previous decisions on the interpretation of competence, the Consti-
tutional Court besides completely performing the constitutional authority 
concerning a subsequent norm control takes also the foreign examples of the 
constitutional review of international treaties into account. Finally, the 
Constitutional Court refers to the fact that the review of the constitutionality of 
international treaties remains within the framework of its constitutional duty: 
subsequent norm control and does not allude to the sphere of authority and 
duty of other branches of power.49  
 The Constitutional Court thus through the interpretation of competence, 
by the correlation of constitutional provisions and through the application of 
different—historical, logical etc.—interpretation methods stated and corrobo-
rated the existence of an authority not declared expressis verbis in a provision, 
but which may be deduced from the text of the law. The Court descriptively 
showed that not even in the subsequent norm-control procedure did they apply 
the right of annulment provided by law, but the constitution conform inter-
pretation of the Constitution, a method which conforms to the protection of the 
Constitution and the principle of constitutionality which however bears no 
statutory ground. Thus through the interpretation and analysis of the principles 
and provisions of the Constitution certain issues of authority may be deduced, 
which otherwise are not named definitely among the provisions. 
 b) The Constitutional Court applied the method of extensive or restrictive 
interpretation several times and in connection with its different competences. 
These decisions construing the sphere of authority well demonstrate that the 
Court fulfil their authority by taking the principle of the separation of powers 
into account, in accordance with their constitutional status.50 According to the 
Constitutional Court, in the process of the interpretation of their authority “the 
principle of the separation of powers should be taken into account to a greater 
extent, since that is the most important organizational and operational principle 
of the Hungarian state organisation”.51 The Court thus exercises its authority 
by considering its constitutional legal status, by respecting the principle of the 
separation of powers not merely through the mechanic application of express 
provisions but by taking all the relevant legal principles and values,52 arising 
from the Constitution into consideration. The same can be referred to the acts 
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reviewed: in the course of the constitutional review the Court takes other 
provisions, principles and values into account. In relation to the directives on 
unifying the case law—by having regard for the content involved in the 
Constitutional Court decisions referred to above—it can be verified that in the 
process of a potential constitutional review the principle of the separation of 
powers is not infringed. As a consequence of the constitutional review of 
directives on unifying the case law, the Constitutional Court will not become a 
part of the judicial system, will not rise above the Supreme Court, because it is 
entitled to review the normative acts of the Supreme Court exclusively from a 
constitutional point of view, and cannot be in favour of the fact if their content 
is right or wrong, well-grounded or unfounded. The Constitutional Court is not 
entitled to verify that the standpoint of the Supreme Court taken up in a directive 
on unifying the case law is legally improper, misinterpreted, or mistaken 
concerning civil, criminal, administrative etc. law. The Constitutional Court 
may take a stand exclusively in question of constitutionality but in those, they 
may definitely take a stand.  
 c) On the ground of the fact sorted out above, it can be seen that the 
Constitutional Court may exercise the review of the directives on unifying the 
case law of the Supreme Court in lack of an expressis verbis constitutional or 
statutory authorisation as well. This right would be excluded only by an express 
prohibition of the Constitution or an act. Because of this, the Supreme Court 
(the intention of which is that the Constitutional Court could not proceed against 
their normative acts), in order to realise their intention, should “persuade” the 
Parliament to exempt directives on unifying the case law from below the 
Constitutional Court control with an express statutory prohibition. It is 
important, if the Supreme Court does not wish to provide the possibility for the 
review, it is not enough to attain or urge that the Parliament should leave the 
issue unregulated. At this time, however it will be transferred to the competence 
of the Constitutional Court and that body will decide in the question what sort 
of possibility exists against directives on unifying the case law, related to a 
concrete matter. In lack of an unambiguous constitutional or statutory 
prohibition, if only the regulating element concerning the review is “made to 
be omitted” from the act, the Constitutional Court may—without an express 
provisional ground, just by taking other principles, derivable from the 
Constitution and by providing the highest level safeguard of the Constitution, 
fulfil the review and in a given case, the annulment of a directive on unifying 
the case law. The Constitutional Court however, has undertaken a similar 
activity. Because of this, even if the new text of the Constitution or the new 
Act on the Constitutional Court did not express the possibility of a Constitu-
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tional Court review of directives in unifying the case law, it would not 
definitely restrict the activity of the Constitutional Court in such matters.  
 
4. The concrete Constitutional Court review of directives on unifying the  
case law, the correlation between living law and constitutional 
requirements 
 
a) Provided that the Constitutional Court review in relation to directives on 
unifying the case law is recognised, in the case of unconstitutionality the Court 
can choose from two solutions. One of them is to annul the directive on 
unifying the case law bearing an unconstitutional interpretation.53 The other is 
to apply their statements concerning the correlation between the interpretation 
of “living law” and constitution conform interpretation.54 Accordingly, the consti-
tutional protest (constitutional complain) related to judicial law enforcement 
may call forth a two-step Constitutional Court procedure. If the judicial practice 
applies the given provision in an unconstitutional way, the Constitutional Court 
will express the constitutional content of the provision in a decision. Provided 
that the judicial practice neglects the decision of the Constitutional Court, and 
because of this the law will enter into force as the result of unconstitutional 
law enforcement, the Constitutional Court will annul the given law on the 
ground of the principle of “living law”.55 Referring all this to directives on 
unifying the case law, the Court first would verify a constitutional requirement, 
and if the Supreme Court, and other courts later on did not recognise this 
requirement, the Constitutional Court would annul the given directive on 
unifying the case law on the principle of “living law”. It is important to realise 
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that in this case not the given law but the directive on unifying the case law 
should be annulled. The reason for this is that the annulment of the directive 
on unifying the case law—even if the ex nunc annulment is taken as a base—
would result in the—probably only partial—“fall off” of an act from the legal 
system. It may happen, however that a directive on unifying the case law is the 
result of the interpretation of a number of laws. Because of this, in some cases, 
it would lead to difficulties and in other cases; it would be impossible to decide 
which of the laws construed should be annulled to restore constitutionality. On 
the other hand, if the Constitutional Court reached the same result through the 
annulment of several acts instead of nullifying just one, legal security would 
also be affected. It is also expedient to refer to the separate opinion of Géza, 
Kilényi justice of the Constitutional Court, related to the theory of “living 
law”. He states “if the legal practice by the unconstitutional interpretation 
come up against law, the organs exercising law enforcement must be enforced 
to undertake the constitutional interpretation and application of the act (or other 
provision) by the use of the appropriate legal means. It is not the legislator 
who should be punished because of the unconstitutional law enforcement of 
legislative organs, which means the Constitutional Court annuls the law, which 
upon a correct constitutional interpretation would not be unconstitutional”.56 In 
my opinion, this argument is very acceptable in the respect that not the 
fundamental rule (provisions) but the unity of law decision drafting the 
unconstitutional interpretation should be annulled. Unconstitutionality thus, 
besides complying with the requirements arising from constitutionality may be 
redressed in a single way: by the annulment of the unconstitutional directive 
on unifying the case law.  
b) In relation to the examination of living law it must be seen “the 
Constitutional Court reviews the norm content, appearing in the permanent 
judicial practice, namely handles court interpretations as a fact and judges the 
constitutionality of a norm existing in practice. By the review of living law the 
Constitutional Court undeniably supervises the constitutionality of judicial 
practice, however not in a concrete case but in a general form having consolidated 
into a norm: Constitutional Court control refers not to the concrete litigation 
but to the norm creating activity of the judicial power. Judge made law, which 
has prevailed invincibly and uniformly for a long time, is a legal form just like 
the decisions of the Supreme Court, which specify uniform law enforcement 
with an obligatory force. The Constitutional Court review of these provisions 
leaves the independence of judicial litigation intact. May unconstitutionality 
arise, the Constitutional Court will nullify the norm or specify the potential 
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constitutional applications of the norm, but will not deal with court rulings.”57 
Constitutional requirement is also a norm: the Constitutional Court “in the 
tenor specifies it with the generality of a norm”58 The possibility for the consti-
tutional review of “living law” corroborates the requirement that directives on 
unifying the case law should be, by all means, placed under the review of the 
Constitutional Court. 
c) Since the potential consequences of Constitutional Court decisions arise 
concerning the planned new regulation as well, these and the significantly 
dissenting ideas of legal literature will be discussed together with the new 
concept on regulation.  
 
 
II. New ideas about the Constitutional Court, which concern directives on 
unifying the case law 
 
1. The pertinent sections of the previous regulation concerning the 
 Constitutional Court 
 
The review of the regulation concerning the Constitutional Court has been in 
process for quite a long time. In favour of the amendment, the Ministry of 
Justice have prepared a number of bills already in 2000 and attached a “Propo-
sition” to the conception to give grounds for the necessity of an amendment. In 
the Proposition, there is a summary of the arguments for and against the notions 
concerning the new regulation, and the necessity of the modification and the 
certain professional and political opinions connected to the ideas are accounted 
for in detail. Different viewpoints are contrasted in relation to the Constitu-
tional Court review of directives on unifying the case law and the advantages 
and risks concealed behind the ideas are also demonstrated. By virtue of the 
persuasive argumentation of the Proposition, it is not justified that while the 
normative decisions of the other two branches of power fall under a Constitu-
tional Court control, there is no such possibility concerning directives on 
unifying the case law. Nevertheless, the Proposition sorts out arguments—
which, in my opinion do not seem to be persuasive—against the review as well.  
 a) According to one of the arguments, in this way the Constitutional Court 
may have a review of judicial law enforcement. Pursuant to the proposal “the 
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alternative means against the courts may be grounded by the special character 
of this branch of power.” The judicial branch of power is of a special character; 
decisions are not influenced by politics thus, there is no definite reason for a 
legal and professional sifting of the decisions (norms).  
b) Pursuant to the other counter argument, the above authority would not 
comply with Article 47, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, because it states; the 
uniform law enforcement of the courts is provided by the Supreme Court. 
Beyond this, the normative content of directives on unifying the case law is not 
equivalent to a law; since it will not verify a new legal content: just expound that 
of the law. Not even their binding force is equal, because directives on unifying 
the case law oblige the courts only. The Proposition, reflecting the political 
standpoint of the government finally states: “The professional arguments under-
line the variant that the Constitutional Court should not be entitled to the 
review of directives on unifying the case law.”59 
 These counter arguments, I think have not been deliberate enough or they 
are not relevant to settle the issue. As to the first counter argument, it is not 
persuasive that the review of the normative acts of the legislative and 
executive power is justified because their decisions are effected by politics, 
thus their professional sifting is justified however, that of the courts, in lack of 
a political character, is not justified. Constitutional Court control is not simply 
a “professional sifting”, but a special sphere of that: constitutional control. In 
questions of constitutionality, however there is no difference between directives 
on unifying the case law and the normative acts of the other two branches of 
power. It is no doubt that the Parliament and the majority of ministries, alike 
the Supreme Court, have expert advisory panels to justify and enforce constitu-
tionality. Notwithstanding, uniform constitutionality may be ensured only if all 
the acts of normative character, which are based on law fall under the control 
of the Constitutional Court.  
 The second counter argument was not well grounded either. Securing the 
unity of law enforcement is not equal to the control of the constitutionality of 
the norm providing “security”. The uniformity of law enforcement, totally 
independently from the Constitutional Court control, would be exercised by 
the Supreme Court further on, because the Constitutional Court would not 
exercise a control on criminal-, civil-, and administrative law interpretation, 
different from that involved in directives on unifying the case law, but would 
have an exclusive constitutional control. 
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2. The amendment of the Constitution intended in 2003 
 
In connection with the subsequent norm control, the Constamend2, as a 
significant amplification and important progress, would also provide the 
constitutional foundation to the constitutional review of directives on unifying 
the case law.60 In the Constamend2, the review of conflict with international 
treaties would also have constructed a separate section and the scope of norms 
reviewed would have been amplified—among others—with directives on 
unifying the case law. It must be mentioned that the proposal made by the 
Minister of Justice of the previous Government involved the same solution, so 
there is an apparent political consensus in this respect. Notwithstanding, 
there is a significant difference between the drafts as regards that the first 
Constitutional amendment would have authorized the Constitutional Court to 
annul directives on unifying the case law conflicting with the Constitution, in 
the second draft there is no reference to a possibility on the annulment of 
directives on unifying the case law. The reason for this is that the revised 
version would refer the obligation to withdraw directives on unifying the case 
law declared unconstitutional, within the authority of the Supreme Court.  
 
3. Notions related to the drafts of the new Act on the Constitutional Court 
 
a) General rules 
 
aa) The original draft of the Act on the Constitutional Court would have 
provided the possibility for the suspension of the application of a directive on 
unifying the case law and it would have been referred under the authority of 
the full session. The revised draft however would not provide this possibility. 
The reason for the annulment is the withdrawal concerning directives on 
unifying the case law, which would make the proposal null and void.  
 ab) As regards directives on unifying the case law, provided that a proposal 
related to such an act of the Supreme Court would be presented to the body, 
they were obliged to pass it to the President of the Supreme Court for an 
opinion.61 Pursuant to the Act on the Constitutional Court2, the decision on the 
unconstitutionality of a directive on unifying the case law should be published 
in the Official Journal too. Its basis is Article 38, Paragraphs 1, and 2 of the 

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 Because of the considerable resistance of the Supreme Court, however the success of 
recognition is doubtful.  
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 Act on the Const. Court2, Article 29, Paragraph 1. 
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new draft, according to which the Constitutional Court must publish their 
decisions, besides their own official gazette, in the Official Journal as well.  
 ac) The Act on the Constitutional Court2 would not let the Constitutional 
Court apply a temporary provision in connection with a directive on unifying 
the case law.  
 
b) Conceptions related to certain procedures 
 
ba) In relation to the review of conflict with an international treaty, the 
 following conceptions have appeared 
 
baa) The scope of reviewable norms would be extended on other legal means 
of self-governmental administration and directives on unifying the case law, 
which would lead to the mild differentiation of the procedure.  
 Pursuant to Article 43, Paragraph 2 of the Act on the Constitutional Court, 
if the Constitutional Court verifies that a directive on unifying the case law 
conflicts with an international treaty, the Supreme Court will withdraw the 
decision within thirty days from the promulgation of the decision (namely the 
decision of the Constitutional Court). Concerning a directive on unifying the 
case law, there is no need to examine the level of legal source, because this act 
is not a law, thus its position could not be interpreted in relation to provisional 
hierarchy. However, it is doubtful why the Act on the Constitutional Court2 
makes it impossible for the Supreme Court to amend the directive on unifying 
the case law conflicting with an international treaty and why the draft 
immediately operates with withdrawal. This latter possibility should also be 
provided for the supreme judicial body. 
 The Constitutional Court was not given the possibility to provide a 
constitution conform interpretation concerning the directives on unifying the 
case law of the Supreme Court. 
 bab) Since a directive on unifying the case law can never occupy a higher 
level than a law promulgating an international treaty, thus it does not require 
any regulation, so related to this the Act on the Constitutional Court2 does not 
involve any specification.  
 bb) In connection with the subsequent review of unconstitutionality—
although the Constamend2 would permit the review of directives on unifying 
the case law, the ConstCourt bill2 would not provide the pro futuro annulment 
in relation to directives on unifying the case law. It has a base of principle and 
practice as well: on the one hand, the creation of a directive on unifying the 
case law would probably take less time than the amendment of another norm 
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or the creation of a new regulation. On the other hand—and this is the more 
important reason—if a directive on unifying the case law is nullified, it will 
not give rise to a lack of regulation, because for the organs of law enforcement 
the relevant provisions still exist, however in their regard a wider scope of 
freedom will appear. In addition to that, the requirements of principle, 
involved in the nullified directive on unifying the case law—if due to the 
character of the annulment it is not excluded—may be applied and taken into 
account concerning the decision of the Constitutional Court, together with the 
decision and the constitutional content.  
 bc) Above this, by virtue of Article 50, Paragraph 2 of the ConstCourt 
bill2, provided that the provisions of the bill are realised, the Constitutional 
Court could order the review of the criminal procedure determined on the 
ground of an unconstitutional law or directive on unifying the case law.  
 bd) Besides this, the Constitutional Court could act in the concrete norm 
control procedure initiated by the judge, even against the directive on unifying 
the case law not in effect any longer. The same would be competent in the 
procedure of a constitutional complain. If the Constitutional Court acting 
within this latter authority would verify the unconstitutionality of a directive 
on unifying the case law referred to by the constitutional complain, the 
Supreme Court would be obliged to withdraw the unconstitutional directive on 
unifying the case law within thirty days after its promulgation.  
be) In connection with the constitutional complain the major elements of 
the present solution would survive in the ConstCourt bill2. The draft, on the 
ground of the infringement of rights included in the Constitution will provide 
the possibility for those, whose grievance is the consequence of the application 
of an unconstitutional normative act—among them directives on unifying the 
case law—and the infringement of rights may be the subject of the 
Constitutional Court’s review, if he has exhausted all the other possibilities for 
remedy or there are no other possibility for remedy. 
 bf) If the unconstitutionality is the result of the omission of legislative 
obligation, directives on unifying the case law should not be taken into 
account. The reason for this is partly that the effective acts and bills—count 
(would count) only an omission embodied in the omission of the drafting of a 
law by the legislative organ, under the effect of the action. The involvement of 
directives on unifying the case law in this sphere would recognise the legislative 
character of the Supreme Court expressis verbis, to which the legislators do not 
at present show any reluctance. On the other hand, since the already existing 
acts can be interpreted without the existence of a directive on unifying the case 
law, actually there is no omission related to them: the purpose and substance of 
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the creation of a directive on unifying the case law however, is not to draft a 
new provision but to clear up the meaning of a provision.  
 
 
III.  Further potential solutions 
 
Since in the special literature there are several potential solutions concerning 
the review of directives on unifying the case law in the following, I will 
shortly introduce the variant not adapted in the drafts. The reason for this is 
that the regulation concerning the Constitutional Court is before acceptance, 
thus a proposal (or part of a proposal), which is not included in the draft may 
be reflected in the subsequent versions or in the final text of the law. The 
solutions not having inserted are different from the variants involved in the 
draft concerning some legal consequences proposed for the unconstitutionality 
of a directive on unifying the case law.  
 a) According to the related proposal, the Constitutional Court would be 
entitled to verify the unconstitutionality but the possibility of annulment—
alike in the ConstCourt bill2—would not be included among the means of the 
Court. Thus, unconstitutionality could be eliminated in the way that the 
Constitutional Court would withdraw the unconstitutional directive on 
unifying the case law within a definite time after the promulgation of the 
decision. It means that the Constitutional Court would retain its right of review 
but the actual authority of annulment would be referred to the Supreme Court. 
The present President of the Constitutional Court András Holló for instance 
has expounded “according to the standpoint of the Constitutional Court as a 
result of the constitutional review of a directive on unifying the case law, the 
Constitutional Court would reach a so called “verifying decision”, namely 
would just verify that the directive on unifying the case law is unconstitutional 
but its legal consequence, the annulment of the directive on unifying the case 
law would remain within the authority of the Supreme Court.”62 Notwith-
standing I do not think that the Supreme Court, based on the opinion of the 
Constitutional Court will be inclined to nullify the act of their own, because 
even in the issue of Constitutional Court review they show a sharply negative 
attitude. President Holló himself had a solution for the verification of the 
unconstitutionality of directives on unifying the case law. According to his 
opinion “if the Constitutional Court, instead of the annulment of the provision 
interpreted by a directive on unifying the case law, will specify the constitu-
tional requirements competent in the application of the law, this specification—
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since the Constitutional Court decision has a general binding force—is 
normative on the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court must harmonize directives 
on unifying the case law with the aspects specified under the constitutional 
requirements. As long as it has been fulfilled, the directive on unifying the 
case law cannot be applied.”63 However, it is doubtful if in this case until the 
“harmonization” it is to be adhered to the decision of lower level courts, the 
Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court. It is to be feared that to the latter: 
notwithstanding, court rulings, through the forum system of remedy can get 
before the Supreme Court quite easily, where the will of this organ will be 
enforced.  
 b) In relation to this solution it must be mentioned that concerning its 
substance it would not make any difference as if the Constitutional Court 
annulled the directive on unifying the case law, but it would bear a number of 
factors of uncertainty.  
 ba) Partly, even if the standpoint seemingly seeks a compromise between 
the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, there are also some risks 
concealed in the proposal. Beyond the aspects of prestige, it is all the same if a 
directive on unifying the case law regarded as unconstitutional is nullified by 
the Supreme Court and not the Constitutional Court. The only argument for 
may be that in this case, the Supreme Court’s amending potential will prevail, 
but this will remain under the pro futuro annulment possibility as well—which 
is however, intended not to be provided. A complicated and detailed regulation 
is required in the matter if the Supreme Court—by standing against the opinion 
of the Constitutional Court—would not annul a directive on unifying the case 
law. At this time, it may be problematic to provide the mode of the solution. 
One variation could be that in this case—within an appointed time—the 
Constitutional Court would be obliged to proceed in an obligatory way and 
practised the authority of annulment. The other proposal covers that the 
directive on unifying the case law, by virtue of the law, should become invalid 
within definite time. In my opinion, neither of the solutions deviates in their 
effect from the annulment coeval with the verification of unconstitutionality 
exercised by the Constitutional Court, but they would cause a significant waste 
of time and result in legal insecurity.  
 bb) Notwithstanding, Géza Kilényi, former Justice at the Constitutional Court, 
states “indirect repeal is different from direct repeal not mainly concerning its 
sense but rather in the array of the procedure. The decision in this case is also 
made by the Constitutional Court but at this time, the body does it in a covert 
way and the legislative organ is forced to fulfil the task. The indirect repeal is 

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more polite than the direct repeal but undoubtedly much more circumstantial 
as well.”64 I think putting the proposal into a statutory form could not be 
accepted by the Supreme Court either, and above this, if realised it would 
actually be equal to annulment, thus the application of a circumstantial and 
complicated regulation would not be obedient in the creation of the new act.  
c) The method of the so-called constitution-conform constitution interpretation 
generally applied by the Constitutional Court may be connected to the issue of 
annulment.65 According to the practice of the Constitutional Court it briefly 
means—although “living law”, namely the “permanent and uniform” content 
appearing in the legislative practice must also be taken into account during the 
constitutional review of the norm—, and the annulment of a law should be 
avoided, if possible. Pursuant to the principle followed by the Constitutional 
Court, effective law should be preserved. Consequently the Constitutional Court 
will not necessarily annul the given provision, but if among its interpretative 
possibilities there is a variant of interpretation which conforms to the Constitu-
tion, the Court will specify the so called “constitutional requirements” competent 
in the application of the norm. Because of this, if there is a possibility to provide 
the prevalence of constitutionality by leaving the norm text unchanged, the 
requirements that should be applied or taken into account to make a law 
constitutional are specified in the clause of the decision. Obviously, if the 
legislative practice will not conform to this, the only way open for the 
Constitutional Court is to nullify the law.  
 d) Notwithstanding, in my opinion the method to specify constitutional 
requirements related to a directive on unifying the case law could be applied in 
no way. In that case, namely the Constitutional Court actually may not decide 
about a constitutional issue, but about a problem belonging to another branch 
of power, thus would take over the role of the Supreme Court. The reason for 
this is that the directive on unifying the case law has made one sense of the law 
bearing several interpretations obligatory for the courts. If by specifying the 
constitutional requirement, it were narrowed down further on, it would either 
make the directive on unifying the case law devoid of content, or result in an 
interpretation regarded as incorrect by the Supreme Court. Concerning the 
principle of the separation of powers however, it would be inadmissible. The 
Constitutional Court may keep directives on unifying the case law within 
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constitutional limits if a constitutional requirement, related to the law that 
forms the basis of the directive on unifying the case law is specified.  
 
 
IV.  Summary 
 
In my view the Constitutional Court review of directives on unifying the case 
law may be administered on the ground of the effective legal background. 
Notwithstanding, a satisfying legal solution will require the uniformity of 
positive law regulation. Since besides the point of view of prestige, there is no 
reason why the Constitutional Court should not review—obviously exclusively 
on the ground of constitutional respects—the directives on unifying the case 
law of the Supreme Court, for the sake of the protection of the fundamental 
law, this competence should be provided for the Constitutional Court with the 
possibility of annulment.  
 Any different regulation would lead to the total disturbance of constitutional 
jurisdiction, which cannot be supported in a constitutional state. However, it is 
a healthy sign that in a recent decision of the Constitutional Court on the subject 
of a proposal initiating the constitutional review of a directive on unifying the 
case law, a decree of annulment was delivered because the person in question 
withdrew his proposal.66 Since a decree of annulment must be preceded by a 
genuine examination—because submissions not falling within the authority 
of the body are refused—in that case the genuine constitutional control of 
directives on unifying the case law in all probability has been in progress. 
Provided that an appropriate proposal is presented, the Constitutional Court 
will hopefully pass a resolution concerning the constitutionality of a directive 
on unifying the case law. 
 


 
66
 213/B/1999 Const, Court decree. ABK 2003 September, 638, 639. 
